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“History is the Spectre Haunting Modern Society”: 
Temporality and Praxis in Guy Debord’s Hegelian 
Marxism 
 
 
Introduction1 
 
Within fields associated with the conjunction of Western Marxism and philosophy, the work 
of Guy Debord and the Situationist International (S.I.) often tends to receive rather less 
attention than it deserves. Whilst focussing on their famous concept of ‘spectacle’, this essay 
will try to show that Debord’s work may offer a richer resource to contemporary political 
philosophy than might otherwise be imagined. We will begin with a brief discussion of some 
of the problems and trends that have coloured the academic reception of this material, before 
presenting an initial interpretation of Debord’s account. This will serve to relate the concept 
of spectacle to the S.I.’s broader aims and ambitions.2 Our principal aim, however, is not 
simply to develop a reading of Debord and the S.I.’s critique of spectacular society per se, but 
rather to show that spectacle should also be seen to function as a much broader historical and 
ethical problematic. Addressing it in this manner can serve to highlight the theory of 
communism qua collective historical praxis that it contains. The approach attempted here is 
thus intended to augment more explicitly Marxian readings of Debord’s treatment of capital 
and commodities, by highlighting the broader, more existential and Hegelian conceptions of 
temporality, subjectivity and agency that support his analyses, and which inform the wider 
conceptual framework that underlies his mature oeuvre. 
Developing this reading will thus require a discussion of some of the philosophical 
positions that support Debord’s claims. To that end, and in order to make good on the 
proposition above – i.e. that this material may afford a more complex and nuanced resource 
than is often supposed – we will advance this interpretation of spectacle whilst demonstrating 
that Debord’s work contains the following, still largely overlooked elements: 1) a 
philosophical anthropology; 2) a speculative philosophy of history; 3) the rudiments of an 
epistemology; 4) an implicit ethics; 5) a dialectical conception of strategy. As these topics 
constitute facets of the interpretation of Hegelian Marxism that underlies Debord’s work, 
addressing the concept of spectacle in connection to them can provide a means towards 
reconstructing and discussing that interpretation. Such a reconstruction is necessary, as whilst 
the influence of Hegel’s philosophy is evident throughout Debord’s work, substantial 
statements concerning his use thereof are sparse; we will therefore need to make use of 
textual evidence, archive material and reference to the writers that he drew upon. It should 
however become apparent from what follows below that the version of Hegelian Marxism 
that can be inferred from Debord’s account amounts to what might be termed (admittedly 
problematically)3 a philosophy of praxis, and that spectacle should be understood primarily in 
terms of the deprivation of the relation to history that that mode of praxis entails. We will also 
see that these ideas actively point beyond Debord’s extant formulations, and towards the 
production of new, more contemporary theoretical positions. 
As the claims advanced here will jar somewhat with Anglophone academia’s tendency 
to treat Debord as a media theorist, and to view the S.I. as an art movement,4 we will begin 
with a short discussion of the manner in which this material is typically handled. The second 
part of the essay will then provide a brief overview of Debord’s claims; the third will then 
attempt to advance the argument outlined above, and the fourth will conclude with an 
overview of Debord’s Hegelianism. 
 
1) Approaches to Debord’s theory 
 
Interpreting the theory of spectacle 
 
According to Debord, the spectacle “cannot be understood either as a deliberate distortion of 
the visual world or as a product of the technology of the mass dissemination of images”.5 
Furthermore, the “mass media” is said to be only its “most stultifyingly superficial 
manifestation”.6 However, statements such as these tend to jar markedly with the manner in 
which Debord’s work is often treated, as his predominantly visual terminology is often 
treated in a predominantly literal sense. According to one symptomatic example of such 
commentary, “spectacle” is thus said to refer to “the system of the mass media”, to “the social 
force of television”, and to “the form taken by the gaze within a consumer-capitalist 
society”.7 Yet despite their disparity with Debord’s own remarks, claims such as these are far 
from uncommon; and even when reference is made to the crucial Marxian elements of his 
theory, this emphasis on the visual and the media still tends to predominate. The spectacle 
thus becomes the maintenance of a unifying ideology through media forms;8 a literally visual 
reformulation of Lukács’ account of contemplative detachment;9 or simply the fads, fashions, 
communication and entertainment that articulate contemporary desire and opinion.10  
 All of these readings are certainly partly correct: Debord does indeed address 
phenomena such as this. Furthermore, “news or propaganda, advertising or the actual 
consumption of entertainment” were said to be “particular forms”11 of spectacle, and the very 
fact that such phenomena constitute the spectacle’s most “superficial” appearances 
necessarily entails their connection to its inner dynamic. Yet by that same token, 
interpretations that treat spectacle by focussing on its superficial manifestations lend 
themselves to addressing symptoms as though they were a cause. At root, Debord’s spectacle 
denotes a condition of fetishistic separation from bodies of individual and collective power: a 
separation that ultimately amounts, as we will see below, to a condition in which human 
subjects become detached from their capacities to shape their own lived time. As this entails a 
relation between a passive, spellbound subject and an active, seemingly independent object, it 
certainly relates to the role played by imagery and entertainment within modern society: their 
profusion was in fact held to reflect the sense in which modern capitalism had brought that 
dynamic of contemplative separation to such an extreme that it had become expressed in full, 
self-evident view across the surface of a society that it had moulded to the very core.12 Yet it 
remains the case that that inner dynamic constitutes the real heart of the concept, and that it 
by no means pertains solely to the media and the visual. Ultimately, The Society of the 
Spectacle describes a society that has come to be characterised by its separation from its own 
history, as a result of abdicating its capacity to shape its future to a sovereign economy.  
The question that might then arise is as follows: if this is indeed the case, then how 
could the tendency to treat spectacle in literally visual and media-centric terms ever have 
become so widespread? 
 An initial response might be to point out that Debord’s texts are often dense, and 
frequently rather more complex than they appear. For example, much of the difficulty of The 
Society of the Spectacle derives from its attempt to combine elegant concision with the 
broadest of scopes: to bring “together and explain a wide range of apparently disparate 
phenomena”13 by gathering them under the rubric of a concept capable of grasping the 
essential characteristics, and indeed the potential negation, of the “historical moment in 
which we are caught”.14 This ambition requires the concept to operate on several registers at 
the same time. It refers not only to the central dynamic of that “moment”, but also to specific 
phenomena within it (hence the prevalence of the error, referred to above, of confusing 
symptom with cause). The difficulty of Debord’s texts is also amplified by his attempts to 
adequate their form to their content, and to thereby ward off the danger of merely 
representing the refusal of spectacle. Hence The Society of the Spectacle’s extensive use of 
détournement,15 which allows it to actualise the negation of modern culture that it advocates; 
hence also its Adornian refusal to stoop, through easy exposition, to the level of its targets (an 
early statement of 1952, in which he declared “I will never give explanations”,16 can thus be 
seen to have set the tone for much of what would follow). This peculiarly strategic approach 
to writing17 becomes all the more complicated in some of Debord’s later, and seemingly more 
straightforward works, as a result of their attempts to respond to the spectacle’s purported 
infiltration of its own negation. Panegyric is thus deliberately “crammed with traps”,18 and 
1988’s Comments on the Society of the Spectacle begins by warning its readers to beware 
“certain lures” within its pages, “like the very hallmark of the era”19 (Many have admitted 
their perplexity in regard to this odd warning,20 but its meaning can be discerned from 
evidence in Debord’s correspondence and broader work).21 Suffice it to say that these texts 
are often much more complex than they may first appear,22 and it would seem that their 
consequent difficulty has, at times, fostered the adoption of a crudely literal approach to 
terms such as ‘image’, ‘representation’ and ‘spectacle’ (as one particularly frustrated writer 
once put it: “when Debord pompously writes ‘everything that was directly lived has 
withdrawn into a representation’, the prick is simply saying that we see posters of naked 
women pushing brands of cigarettes”).23 
However, beyond the difficulties posed by Debord’s occasionally baroque mode of 
presentation, a more serious obstacle to the comprehension of his work was set up by the 
intellectual ambience that coloured its initial academic appropriation. In a letter of 1971, in 
which he responded to questions from a reader of The Society of the Spectacle, Debord 
remarked that “one cannot fully comprehend [the book] without Marx, and especially 
Hegel”;24 yet during the 1980s and 1990s, and thus when his own and the S.I.’s works first 
began to be enthusiastically adopted by academia, both writers had fallen from fashion. 
Debord himself complained of the degree to which the “German origin” of “nearly all”25 of 
his theory’s key elements had been overlooked; for as Hegel and Marx had been rendered, 
respectively, the unacceptable and obsolete epitomes of a dead modernism, the primarily 
Hegelian ideas upon which his theory relies slipped from view. As unfamiliarity with the 
theory’s conceptual mechanics can render its terminology opaque, this perhaps fostered the 
temptation of a primarily visual interpretation, which in turn eased by the theory’s 
Anglophone adoption by disciplines such as visual culture, art history, cultural studies and 
media studies (the latter no doubt facilitated the erroneous, but still widespread tendency to 
conflate spectacle with Baudrillard’s notion of simulacra).26 It therefore seems pertinent to 
stress that Debord is not a “postmodern” writer, but rather a recalcitrant modernist: not a 
post-structuralist, but rather a 20th Century Young Hegelian, whose work owes far more to 
figures such as Cieszkowski, Feuerbach, Stirner and the young Marx than to any of his 
despised contemporaries who had “taken refuge at Vincennes”.27 Yet before we begin to 
develop that Young Hegelian lineage, and thereby outline the reading of Debord’s work that it 
affords, we should first take note some of the more successful, Marxian analyses of his 
claims.   
 It was indicated earlier that the concept of spectacle operates on several levels at the 
same time. Debord indicates as much at the very outset of The Society of the Spectacle,28 but 
a useful clarification of its operation in this regard can be found in a letter of 1973. Debord 
writes there that the concrete reality of the spectacle, as opposed to its relatively superficial 
existence as a set of mediatic and ideological practices, “can only be justified by reference to 
these three degrees: simple technico-ideological appearances / the reality of the social 
organization of appearances / historical reality”.29 On the first of these three “degrees”, or 
levels, the spectacle is simply an ideological and mediatic “part of society”: the sector thereof 
“where all attention, all consciousness, converges”.30 Evidently, this is the level of Debord’s 
analysis upon which much of the academic work referred to above has tended to focus. 
However, on the second level of this schema, and thus “behind the phenomenal appearances 
of the spectacle”, such as “television, advertising, the discourse of the State, etc.,” we find 
what Debord refers to as “the general reality of the spectacle itself”, as “a moment in the 
mode of production.”31 This second, deeper level thus pertains to the connections between the 
concept of spectacle and the social operation of capitalist value. This is the dimension of 
Debord’s theory that has been addressed by some of the best available studies of his work. 
Anselm Jappe’s seminal Guy Debord (1993, in Italian; 1999 in English) is of particular 
significance here,32 as it deals with these themes in detail. It is by no means insignificant, 
given its Hegelian-Marxian focus, that Debord himself referred to it in his correspondence as 
“the best-informed book about me”.33 However, the subordination of lived reality to capital’s 
dictates, which takes place on that second level, also requires the concept of spectacle to 
operate on the third level of this schema, i.e. that of “historical reality”. The articulation of 
lived reality via the social relations of capital involves the separation of human subjects from 
their own lived activity. The result is a historical moment characterised by a loss of historical 
agency, insofar as the latter has been abdicated to an effectively autonomous economic 
system; and it is this level of the concept that we will attempt to address below. 
Clearly, studies that have engaged with that second, Marxian level necessarily bear 
upon the third, but they can ultimately seem somewhat limited in this regard. This is in part 
due to the fact that spectacle cannot be reductively identified with capitalist society, and 
instead denotes a far older and broader historical problematic (as we’ll see below, Debord in 
fact traced its roots all the way back to antiquity). The separation from historical time to 
which the third level of the concept refers certainly stems, at present, from the social 
operation of capitalist value; yet that same dynamic of separation was viewed as having 
preceded modern society (granted, a more exclusively Marxian reading of Debord’s work 
could accommodate this by casting him as inadvertently echoing Sohn-Rethel’s notions of 
‘real abstraction’; however, the more Feuerbachian notion of separated power that will be 
outlined here seems more in keeping with the textual evidence). Debord describes this 
problematic of separation as having developed towards the present, via a succession of 
different social and economic formations, and as having reached a full, identifiable and 
purportedly resolvable extreme within the consumer capitalism of his own day. It thus 
underscores and antecedes the concept of spectacle’s bearing upon the capitalist social 
relations and culture industry proper to the first and second levels of Debord’s schema; and if 
it is to be addressed fully, recourse needs to be made not only to Debord’s use of Marx, 
Lukács, et al, but also to the existential, Hegelian and Young Hegelian themes that structured 
his conceptions of history, subjectivity and temporality.34  
This entails a rather different approach to Debord’s theoretical work than that which 
has been undertaken in recent debate and discussion. Within the context of contemporary 
theory, attention now tends to gravitate towards the homologies that can be discerned 
between Debord’s work and the new readings of Marx (particularly those connected to 
Wertkritik,35 the Neue Marx-Lektüre of figures such as Heinrich and Postone,36 and the 
various currents of so-called communisation theory;37 again, Jappe’s book was seminal in this 
respect).38 Yet whilst those homologies are important and useful, reading Debord under this 
rubric can lend itself to locating his work’s relevance within its contributions to questions of 
structure and social form.39 As the relation between the image and the commodity thus comes 
to take centre-stage, the themes of agency, strategy and praxis that underscore Debord’s 
views on that relation can thus slide into the background. Furthermore: the aspects of 
Hegelian Marxism prevalent within these new readings of Marx tend to centre around Marx’s 
mature use of Hegel as a means of theorising the operation of capital. This is certainly 
relevant to Debord’s account; one need only look to the opening theses of The Society of the 
Spectacle’s second chapter to find evidence for its pertinence. However, Debord’s debts to 
Hegel are primarily inflected by Marx’s early writings, in which the self-determinate 
movement of Hegelian thought is not associated with capital, but rather with the historical 
actions and alienation of the human subject. This more “historicist” approach to Hegelian 
Marxism, to borrow Chris Arthur’s useful shorthand,40 underlies the “systematic” Hegelian 
Marxism at work in Debord’s discussions of capitalist value, and an investigation of the 
former should therefore precede studies of the latter.41 It is therefore hoped that the approach 
attempted here can serve to augment such readings: for if they can be said to focus on 
Debord’s account of the society of the spectacle – i.e. on his description of a specific, socio-
historical and economic moment that fully expresses and instantiates the dynamic of 
separation referred to above – then our own concern will be to address and explore that 
dynamic per se: to thus focus on the broader problematic posed by Debord’s concept, and to 
thereby show how his account might be understood and reinterpreted in that light.  
 Having sketched out some of the themes that have inflected the handling of this 
material we can now move towards addressing it directly. Our first step towards doing so will 
be to provide a broad overview of its central themes. To that end, what follows will 
emphasise the sense in which Debord and the S.I.’s work constitutes a 20th Century re-
figuration of Marx’s early call for the “realisation [Verwirklichung] of philosophy”42 in 
praxis.   
 
2) The realisation of philosophy 
 
Vorstellungen 
 
We will return to Debord’s critique of Hegel in greater detail below, but it can be sketched, in 
essence, as follows. Hegel, for Debord, correctly identified history with self-determinacy and 
self-consciousness; yet he located the full, complete expression of their unity not in the 
concrete process of freely and self-consciously shaping an open future, but rather in a 
purportedly contemplative philosophy that merely admired a seemingly completed world. In 
his view, the consequent task addressed by the Young Hegelian and radical critics that 
followed was thus that of reversing Hegel’s retrospective and detached perspective: to 
“invert” it not by simply bringing the ideal back down to earth, but rather by actualising the 
freedom and self-determinacy that it sought to describe in the conscious creation of an open 
future.43  
 On this view, therefore, Hegel’s philosophy, qua philosophy, comes to be seen as an 
alienated representation (or rather as a Vorstellung: a word that was translated, significantly, 
as représentation in the version of Hegel’s Phenomenology that Debord used)44 of the pro-
active praxis that should supersede it. The identification of self-conscious thought with 
historical movement and freedom advanced by Hegel’s philosophy needed to be translated 
into concrete praxis: thought would no longer contemplate the past, remaining at one remove 
from the world’s transformation, but would become actively engaged in shaping the future. 
Because the core of this issue is the supersession of a state of separation from historical 
process, and thus that of all other modes of separated power and thought that prevent direct 
engagement with the active construction of historical change, Debord credits various Young 
Hegelians with having taken steps towards such an advance (e.g. the critiques of alienated, 
representational power advanced by Feuerbach and Stirner, and Cieszkowski’s call for a 
philosophy of praxis, to which we will return).45 Principal credit is however given to Marx, 
who is cast as having advocated just such a future-oriented stance (tremendous weight is thus 
placed on Marx’s famous final thesis on Feuerbach: “The philosophers have only interpreted 
the world, in various ways; the point is to change it”).46 For Debord, this orientation – i.e. this 
move towards the actualisation of freedom through the self-determinate transformation of the 
world – is in fact the key theme that runs throughout the entire radical tradition, or at least 
throughout what he took to be its genuinely radical elements, as it was seen to amount to an 
incipient call for the total self-determinacy that he and the S.I. advocated. Thus, “all the 
theoretical strands of the revolutionary workers’ movement”, according to The Society of the 
Spectacle, “stem from critical confrontation with Hegelian thought”.47  
This emphasis on the realisation of philosophy can be placed in useful contrast to 
Adorno, who once famously remarked that the moment for philosophy’s actualisation had 
been “missed”:48 its unification with the revolutionary proletariat and consequent 
contribution to the latter’s self-abolition, as advocated by Marx, had failed to transpire. In 
complete contrast, Debord’s entire political and philosophical perspective hinges on the view 
that that challenge and exigency remains in place, albeit having taken on a new, more 
demanding form. In the latter half of the Twentieth Century, it could no longer be confined 
solely to the self-determinate use of thought in a project of shaping the future. Instead, the 
key exigency posed by that final theses on Feuerbach had been radically expanded, as a result 
of the evolution of culture, technology, and the consequent possibilities of shaping lived 
experience within the modern world. Those new, expanded possibilities were currently 
divorced from their producers, as a result of their integument within the social relations of 
capital. Thus the familiar task of wresting control of history from the economy had been 
expanded and enriched, and had been given even greater impetus by the total poverty of self-
determinacy engendered by capital’s penetration into every aspect of lived experience. The 
task at hand, therefore, was now that of reclaiming and employing all such capacities in lived 
praxis, and of abolishing all such separated power, with a view towards affording a new era 
within which lived experience could become the conscious creation of the experiencing 
subject. This ambition was directly connected both to the basic dynamics of Debord’s 
spectacle and to the S.I.’s broader political project.  
 
The spectacle and the Situationists 
 
To treat the former connection first: Debord and the S.I. characterised the modern societies of 
their day as subordinate to their own economic systems. Capitalism, for Debord, essentially 
means the regulation and domination of lived practice by the abstraction of value, and was 
thus viewed in a manner that encompasses its state-bureaucratic and consumer-based variants 
alike. Crucially, the articulation of lived activity through the social relations proper to those 
economic systems was viewed in terms of the separation of social power from its producers. 
All social activity, creative capacity and technological potential had become bound within 
that same all-encompassing general framework, which was held to amount, cumulatively, and 
despite its internal divisions, to a generalised “Weltanschauung”49 capable of operating as a 
concrete, independent and objective force. The intimate penetration of that power throughout 
the lives of the individuals concerned was framed as co-extensive with their alienation from 
it. Their lived activity and the latter’s objective results had thus become a detached object of 
contemplation: a “spectacle”, in other words (or a “show”, to use an alternative translation of 
the French spectacle), in which those same individuals performed.50  
The S.I.’s aim, during their more theoretical and revolutionary Marxian period in the 
1960s, was to herald and foster a response to this state of affairs. This response was not a call 
for a more equitable mode of distribution, or for better working conditions, but rather a 
demand for all that modern technological capitalism had rendered possible and yet 
simultaneously denied. It was thus a call for the supersession of all forms of separated 
capacity and hierarchical power, and for the consequent instantiation of a mode of social 
collectivity that would foster the actualisation of the possibilities that the previous social 
order had merely represented (as Vaneigem put it in 1963: “What do we demand in backing 
the power of everyday life against hierarchical power? We demand everything”).51 The drive 
towards such an extreme, all-encompassing mode of revolt was held to have been fostered 
and generalised throughout society by the same capitalist formations that had generated the 
separation described above. Society’s newfound wealth of consumer goods had seemingly 
alleviated the 19th Century poverty that had exercised Marx, thereby dismissing, for some 
contemporary commentators, the need and desire for social change altogether.52 Yet for 
Debord and the S.I., the proletariat had not been buried “beneath an avalanche of sound 
systems, T.V.’s, small cars and planned communities”,53 but had instead been radically 
expanded. As all life had become shaped and structured by capital, disaffection and alienation 
had become similarly universal, thus engendering a ‘new’ proletariat: a vast, effectively 
classless social ‘class’, composed simply of “all people who have no possibility of altering 
the social space-time that society allots to them”.54 The separation of Marx’s proletarian from 
the means of independently maintaining his or her own existence had thus given way to a 
‘higher’, more existential form of poverty, marked by a separation from the means of 
consciously shaping and directing that existence55 (this reformulation should be borne in 
mind in connection to contemporary criticisms of the S.I.’s alleged ‘workerism’).56 
Initially, and particularly in the years that followed the S.I.’s emergence from the 
avant-garde milieu, the radical self-determinacy that would rectify that state of affairs was to 
be researched and fostered through the construction of ‘situations’: moments of time that 
would unify art and life, through being shaped and lived according to the experiencing 
subjects’ own wishes. The realisation of art that this entailed was explicitly cast as a new, 
modern manifestation of the realisation of philosophy, insofar as it involved actualising 
representations of lived experience in the attempt to consciously transform and shape the 
latter.57 Ultimately, however, this condition was to be attained within a communism that 
amounted to a condition of collective, and radically self-determinate praxis: a communism 
within which no instantiation of social power would be permitted to perpetuate itself 
independently from those who generate it, and which, insofar as all forms of hierarchy and 
representative leadership would therefore be abolished, would thus come close to collectivist 
anarchism in some respects.58   
To sum up this short overview: as will become apparent below, Debord can seem 
almost Bergsonian or Heraclitian at times, as he views the world in terms of temporal 
process.59 Yet nonetheless, he is best viewed as a 20th Century Young Hegelian, as his 
primary claim is that human beings had developed to a point where they could now 
consciously direct that process, through laying claim to their own alienated powers and 
capacities (he in fact once remarked, whilst indicating the historical task addressed by the 
theory of spectacle, that “we have still not resolved the principle problems” raised by the “old 
comrades” of the 19th Century).60 Where Feuerbach, in his critique of religion, talked of the 
projection of human capacity onto the clouds, and of a consequent mode of subordination to 
alienated depictions of humanity’s own abilities, Debord – whilst drawing on the implications 
of Marx’s early critique of Feuerbach61 – casts these powers as a capacity to make history, 
and addresses their transposition onto forms and structures that serve to maintain and 
consolidate an extant social order. The Situationists’ drive towards the reclamation of all such 
alienated thought, art, culture and technological potential was thus understood in terms of the 
supersession of a state of detachment from a potential engagement in the world’s conscious 
transformation.  
Having now set out the basic characteristics of Debord’s claims we can turn to the 
five aspects of his Hegelian Marxism that we listed in the introduction above: philosophical 
anthropology; philosophy of history; epistemology; ethics; strategy. Discussing them should 
serve to advance the following, broader argument. 1) Debord’s views on the human subject 
imply viewing subject-object unity as a condition of self-determinate temporal process; 2) the 
actualisation of that unity was placed at the apex of a narrative of historical development; 3) 
this entails treating spectacle as a broad historical problematic; 4) the latter implies a 
communist ethics, rooted in the operation and perpetuity of a condition of self-determinate 
praxis; 5) the operation of that condition must be an essentially strategic affair. The 
discussions that follow should therefore serve to demonstrate that the problematic of 
spectacle implies a conception of communism qua historical praxis.  
 
3) A communism of time 
 
Philosophical anthropology 
 
Time and temporality are central to Debord’s thought, and to his conception of the 
Situationist project. The “Situationist attitude” was in fact said to entail “going with the flow 
of time [miser sur la fuite du temps; “wagering on the fleeting passage of time”]”.62 
Conversely, the concept of spectacle describes the denial of such an autonomous temporality, 
as spectacular society “separates the subject…from his own time”63 by replacing a potentially 
free, self-determinate and thus “directly lived” existence with the latter’s mere 
“representation”.64 Hence Debord’s description of the spectacle as a “paralysed history”, and 
as an “abandonment of any history founded in historical time”:65 for time – and thus history, 
qua the self-consciousness and application of human action within time – is the milieu within 
which the human subject might shape and determine its self and its world. 
 Debord’s understanding of time undermines the crude, humanistic essentialism that is 
often attributed to his work. He seems to have viewed the human subject as an inherently 
mutable, processual being: as an entity that shapes itself through shaping its world. In this 
regard, his work displays a peculiarly French, mid-Century confluence of Hegelian Marxism 
with the legacy and ambience of Sartrean existentialism66 (inflected, arguably, with residual 
traces of Bergsonism),67 as it is marked by a preoccupation with self-actualisation in time, 
framed via positions that seem informed by French Hegelianism’s characteristic focus on 
Hegel’s links between consciousness, time and negativity.68 For example, Debord states, by 
way of an unattributed69 quotation from Hegel’s Phenomenology, that, “Man – that “negative 
being who is to the extent that he abolishes being” – is one [identique] with time”.70 It seems 
clear that any such identification of the human subject with time and negativity must preclude 
a politics based upon a naïve humanism, or indeed upon the actualisation of a fixed, “natural” 
human essence; so too must it rule out any appeal to a lost, original realm of authenticity 
(contra the claims of some commentators, Debord by no means “postulates a golden age, a 
humanity originally transparent to itself”).71 If the human subject is indeed “one with time”, 
then there can be no fixed human essence at all: human subjects are simply held to possess an 
intrinsic capacity to create and undergo historical change, and any notion of authenticity can 
only pertain to the full, free actualisation of that open capacity. Consequently, spectacle 
should thus be seen to derive not from the occlusion of an original, essential and fixed 
identity, but rather from the alienation and consequent impoverishment of that capacity.  
That alienation was seen to involve human subjects becoming subordinate to social 
forms in which that capacity is expressed, concentrated and reified (religion, dogma, social 
hierarchy, the commodity, etc.). When this occurs, they become alienated from their own 
actions within time, insofar as those actions come to be dictated by their own misrecognised 
and externalised power. Debord’s debts to the young Marx of the Manuscripts are of course 
apparent here, and this informs the manner in which the theory of spectacle essentially re-
casts the classical separation of subject from object as that between a passive observer and a 
contemplated image (a re-formulation that also owes much to the evolution of these ideas 
from Debord’s initial concerns with the detachment of art from lived activity).72 Like the 
alienated object of consciousness in Hegel’s Phenomenology, Debord’s spectacle is an 
unrecognised and seemingly independent expression of the subject that contemplates it; like 
the products of labour described by the young Marx, it is composed of the alienated social 
power and activity of those who have created it. Such an estranged object is cast as an 
‘image’ not solely because it is the focus of a passive, and thus ‘contemplative’ consciousness 
(as in Lukács’ influential work),73 but also because it presents fallacious depictions of its own 
independence, validity and necessity: for insofar as those depictions constitute and engender 
alienated instances of the subject’s direct self-actualisation, they can also be understood as 
paltry representations of the genuine unity of subject and object that would be achieved 
within a fully self-determinate condition of praxis. 
Time is important here once again, for as the goal is to reclaim and actualise a 
capacity to shape history, it follows that the mode of subject-object unity that would resolve 
this condition of separation could not take the form of a fixed, static state of affairs. Instead, it 
seems far closer to a mode of continual, collective, self-determinate movement. What we thus 
find here, therefore, is something very close to the condition implied by the German 
Ideology’s famous description of communism as “the real movement that abolishes [aufhebt] 
the present state of things”;74 a line that The Society of the Spectacle links, notably, to the 
movement of a self-conscious history, and indeed to the dissolution of “all separation”.75  
To sum up these points, as regards our overall argument: the actualisation of the self-
determinacy advocated by the S.I. should be seen as a condition of continual, temporal 
movement, associated with the attainment of a condition of subject-object unity. Given that 
Hegel himself presented the resolution supposedly attained within his philosophy as a 
condition of unity characterised by continual process, rupture, and constant, restless 
movement – and given also that Debord, as we saw in an earlier section of this essay, 
advocated the actualisation of Hegel’s identification of history and self-consciousness in 
concrete praxis – it would seem that Debord’s account re-casts Hegelian resolution as the 
conditions of existence of the ‘real movement’ referred to above. The remainder of this essay 
will attempt to develop the broader dimensions of that model, with a view towards 
highlighting the conception of communism that it entails. We will then return to it at the end 
of the essay, where we will show that it derives, in part, from Debord’s contact with the 
influential French Hegelian Jean Hyppolite.   
 
Philosophy of history 
 
We can start to flesh out this notion of communism by looking at the narrative of historical 
development within which it was situated. The Society of the Spectacle contains no less than 
two, seldom-discussed chapters on time, which describe a historical narrative of development 
and separation. Humanity’s capacity to shape its existence is presented as having developed 
through a succession of technical developments and social and economic forms, but as having 
done so in tandem with its increasing detachment from its producers. This narrative begins 
with the “cyclical time” of early agrarian societies, which were shaped by the pattern of the 
seasons; it then goes on to discuss societies within which a more linear, “historical time” 
emerged as the preserve of the nobility, by virtue of their wars, feuds and lineages, albeit 
whilst remaining “separate from common reality”,76 insofar as this history’s events unfolded 
over and above the lives of those whose socio-economic activity enabled its existence. This 
separation between history and the lives of workers and common people was eventually 
overcome with the advent of the industrial revolution and the rise of capitalism, which 
diffused a linear, irreversible sense of time throughout society; yet as this was time as 
measure, and thus a mode of domination,77 its penetration into lived experience entailed a 
further removal from the possibility of shaping that experience, and thus a further state of 
separation from history. Debord presents this detachment as having reached an extreme 
within his own and the S.I.’s present: for where historical agency had once been transposed 
onto the heavens, and employed within a history peopled by kings, popes and princes that 
played out over the heads of their subjects, society’s growing articulation via the social 
relations of capital had resulted in a context in which history was at once both closer and 
further away than ever before. Debord’s narrative thus presents his society as affording a 
grand, world-historical crux, insofar as its contradictory extremes had forcibly imposed a 
demand for the reclamation and actualisation of this power. It had thus engendered a ‘higher’ 
communist project that would make explicit the implicit drive towards self-determinacy of all 
previous struggles,78 and which would thereby go beyond any of the merely statist or 
economic demands of the past.79  
This reading of history can also be mapped onto Debord’s views concerning the 
legacy and lineage of Hegelian thought, which we outlined earlier. Following Korsch80 and 
Lukács81 he seems to hold that Hegel’s flawed identification of an association between 
freedom, self-consciousness and history was itself predicated upon the ascendance of 
capitalist society: Debord describes the temporality introduced by the bourgeois revolutions 
as “profoundly historical”,82 but maintains that the conscious direction of such history 
remained detached from those that conducted it. Hegel’s presentation of a world that made 
itself corresponds to this temporality, and subsequent Young Hegelian and Marxian calls for 
history’s reclamation respond to its deepening contradiction. Debord himself is situated 
within this implicit narrative, as his own account is positioned at a point at which that 
contradiction could be clearly identified, theorised and (through revolution) resolved: for by 
the middle of the century, “man”, according to Debord, though “separated from his product,” 
had become “more and more, and ever more powerfully, the producer of every detail of his 
world”; and yet at the same time, “the closer his life comes to being his own creation, the 
more drastically he is cut off from that life”.83  
The unification that Debord posited at the apex of this narrative was thus a condition 
within which the totality of subjectively lived experience could indeed become a conscious 
creation; and insofar as this would necessarily take the form of an on-going process, that 
unification must be seen not as the end of history, but rather as something far closer to Marx’s 
allusions (which were referenced several times by Debord and the S.I.)84 to the end of pre-
history.85 Communism, therefore, emerges as the social form within which human beings 
would take charge of their own destiny; and insofar as it was to be a condition of perpetual, 
self-determinate process, it ceases to be identified with a specific political doctrine or 
economic plan, or indeed with any hierarchical social structure. Thus, “History itself”, 
according to The Society of the Spectacle, “is the spectre haunting modern society”.86  
 
Epistemology 
 
It’s important to note that the narrative described here cannot be seen as a teleological 
account of history, insofar as ‘teleological’ is taken to denote an inevitable movement towards 
a pre-ordained outcome. The state of separation that was held to define modern society, and 
indeed the revolutionary resolution that it invited, was viewed as having forcibly imposed the 
awareness that human history is made by no other agency than that of human beings 
themselves. It thus obliged them (and Debord alludes here to the Communist Manifesto) to 
“view their relationships in a clear-eyed manner”.87 From such a perspective it could thus be 
identified that the direction of history could not be the preserve of the economy, however 
much the latter may have monopolised it in the past (or indeed in the projected future of some 
orthodox Marxisms), and that nor could it be said to fall under the purview of the Party, 
Geist, or indeed any other over-arching force. By extension, there can be no “cunning of 
reason” at work within Debord’s account of history, or indeed any other invisible hand 
pulling the strings of the actors concerned. As Marx and Engels put it in The Holy Family: 
“‘history’ is not a person apart, using man as a means for its own particular aims, history is 
nothing but the history of man pursuing his aims.”88 
However, this is not to say that this account of history is devoid of a sense of telos 
altogether, insofar as those “aims”, when viewed cumulatively, display an inherent orientation 
and tendency. The following has to be imputed from Debord’s work, as he remains silent on 
this matter, but the philosophical anthropology described above – which views the human 
subject as possessed of a capacity to shape itself and its world within time – appears to have 
informed the identification of an inherent tendency within history towards the self-conscious 
identification and actualisation of that capacity. Thus, whilst there can be no pre-ordained 
inevitability to historical events, or to their final outcome, there is, nonetheless, an impetus at 
work within them. History, in short, is viewed as moving contingently towards a point at 
which it might be directed intentionally;89 and that point, of course, is the historical moment 
at which Debord’s own analysis locates itself. 
This invites analogy to Hegel’s own account of history. To put it rather glibly: Hegel 
writes himself into his own story, in effect, as his philosophy of history presents the latter as 
necessarily tending towards the emergence of a philosophy such as his own. Although 
Debord cannot claim any such grand metaphysical basis for his own account, he too situates 
himself within his own narrative: human history is characterised by a tendency towards self-
consciousness and self-determinacy, and his work is placed at the point where this becomes 
fully identifiable and resolvable. Yet where Hegel can seal the self-validating legitimacy of 
his own account by casting it as the final realisation of the reason that it holds to be at work 
within history, Debord can make no such claim to truth. The historical instantiation of the 
condition of self-determinacy that it advocates possesses no inevitability, and has no innate 
metaphysical and idealist connection to the theory that would announce its inception. 
Consequently, his work can be no more than an analysis of his moment and of that moment’s 
potential future, developed in the light of a reading of its past. This then means that the only 
claim to truth that he can lay claim to is the degree to which his work’s analyses might be 
validated by subsequent historical events: or more accurately, by the actions undertaken by 
human beings in the course of creating (however unconsciously) their own history. Thus, 
“Nothing is ever proved except by the real movement that dissolves existing relations”.90 
Clearly aware that his work could thus claim no more than a provisional validity, Debord 
made the following, rather disarming remarks in a letter of 1971:  
 
If this concept [of spectacle] is radically false (since it could indeed just be relatively “false”, 
and thus currently “true” for historical thought, in the sense that it is merely the “maximum of 
possible consciousness” presently to be had concerning the society we are in and for which a 
far better explanation will be forthcoming once this society is consigned to the past and the 
process embarked upon in order to consign it is more fully underway) then in the course of this 
book [The Society of the Spectacle] I may well have said a host of other things that are correct 
(the vast majority of which come from comrades down the ages), but because I have 
understood and assembled them solely on the basis of this concept, they would all be in some 
way flawed ... But if the very concept of spectacle is mistaken, then the whole bloody book is 
scuppered. As far as I am aware there is, however, no better one on the subject that concerns us 
here - a point that takes us back to the crucial role of consciousness and its role in history.91    
 
The very notion that human history might be characterised by a move towards 
progressively more conscious and explicit attempts at self-determinacy implies that any 
single body of theory that would contribute towards that process might well be superseded by 
its successors. Clearly, therefore, these epistemological issues do not apply solely to Debord’s 
work alone, but rather to the production of radical theory in general; and the position that 
they ultimately entail is that the validity of a body of theory can only derive from the degree 
to which it serves to articulate and further a historical struggle. This bears direct relation to 
the theme of separation. We saw earlier that Debord’s attempt to unite the form and content of 
his work reflected a desire to avoid merely representing, and thus remaining at one remove 
from the negation that it evokes; here we can add that his work also displays a markedly anti-
Leninist92 desire for a condition of unity between the theory that would articulate the 
movement of history, and the actors that would actually conduct that movement (hence the 
S.I.’s readiness to make such seemingly presumptuous claim as “Our ideas are in everybody’s 
heads”,93 or that “Situationist theory is in the people like fish are in the sea”).94 Theory, in 
other words, was to function as an immanent, recognisable diagnosis of a shared exigency – 
i.e. as a means of clarifying and rendering explicit the inherent contradictions and conflicts of 
a given moment – and was to be employed as a demonstrably practical tool towards resolving 
the situation that provoked its emergence. It was, in other words, to function in a manner akin 
to strategy, albeit a mode of strategic thought that emerged immanently from the movement 
that it purported to articulate. We thus find an interpretation of the “judgement of history” 
here that identifies the latter’s truth with nothing other than history’s progress towards 
freedom and self-determinacy (thus, the “revolutionary movement” knows “that the practice 
of truth is its own milieu of existence, and at the same time, its own historical goal”).95  
Debord’s Hegelian Marxism, we have proposed, re-casts the movement, process and 
unity of Hegelian resolution as the condition of perpetual historical praxis afforded by the 
S.I.’s communism. Insofar as this movement must entail the continual negotiation of 
changing circumstances, the mode of thought associated with it must be inherently strategic. 
The dialectical thought of the Hegelian system thus becomes the strategic thought of 
philosophy’s realisation, as that system’s static Vorstellung of historical self-consciousness 
becomes a mode of active engagement in history’s creation. We will develop this point at 
length below, but we should first note its implications.   
In a film of 1979, titled In Girum Imus Nocte et Consumimur Igni, Debord remarked 
that “Theories are only made to die in the war of time. Like military units, they must be sent 
into battle at the right moment”, and they must be continually “replaced because they are 
constantly being rendered obsolete”.96 Theory, in other words, if it is to avoid degenerating 
into spectacle, cannot claim any perpetuity beyond its relevance and utility to the moment 
from which it arose; and once that moment passes, so too must that body of theory. If it were 
to remain in place beyond that moment, it would become a hypostatised, reified 
representation of the praxis that it once facilitated.  
It takes little imagination to connect that observation to the contemporary celebration 
and acceptance of this once oppositional material (not only is it now a common feature of 
academic and cultural discourse: to much alarm in some quarters97 – albeit to the great 
assistance of studies such as our own – an archive of Debord’s work and personal notes has 
been installed in the Bibliothèque Nationale). Nor is it difficult to note the disparity between 
this view and that of the many commentators who would make claims as to The Society of the 
Spectacle’s continuing validity (a claim that Debord, admittedly, upheld as well: in 1979, he 
declared that he had “no doubt that the confirmation all my theses encounter” would “last 
right until the end of the century and even beyond”).98 For if theories are made to die in the 
war of time, then Debord’s own theory must be subject to that fate too; and if the themes of 
time and history that underlie that theory therefore imply the production of new, subsequent 
theoretical interventions, then the foundations of Debord’s work can be seen to contain a 
model of praxis that points beyond the formulations that he himself built upon them.  
Furthermore: if we retain the distinction that we introduced above, between Debord’s 
account of the society of the spectacle – i.e. of a discrete historical moment – and our attempt 
to highlight the broader problematic of spectacle, then it becomes apparent that superseding 
Debord’s account of that society would not entail jettisoning the concept of spectacle that 
defined it. As noted earlier, that concept, and the problematic to which it refers, is rooted 
within the same philosophical anthropology of human temporality that necessitates such 
continual movement in time. Spectacle, when seen in this broader sense, thus stands as the 
primary antagonist within that “war of time”, as it designates the continual possibility of 
degeneration into conditions of separation, hierarchy and arrest. Seen in this light, spectacle 
thus functions as something akin to an ethical category. 
 
Ethics 
 
This extension of the purview of spectacle beyond Debord’s account can be substantiated by 
noting his indications that it also preceded modern society. As indicated earlier, his theory 
frames modern society as having brought an older and broader dynamic of separation to an 
identifiable and resolvable extreme. Granted, Debord consistently dated the spectacle’s 
emergence to the early decades of the 20th Century. Yet when doing so, Debord was referring 
to the full, complete expression of that older historical tendency; and thus although he 
certainly claims that the spectacle “corresponds to the historical moment at which the 
commodity completes its colonisation of social life”,99 such remarks should be understood as 
referring to the inception of that full expression. Support for this view can be found in his 
correspondence, where he writes as follows:  
 
[The spectacle] has its basis in Greek thought; it increased towards the Renaissance (with 
capitalist thought); and still more in the 18th century, when one opened museum collections to 
the public; it appeared under its completed form around 1914-1920 (with the brain washing 
[bourrage de crâne] of the war and the collapse of the workers” movement).100  
 
All of the phenomena referred to within that quotation relate to the dynamic of 
separated power. The reference to Greek thought can be understood as pertaining to the 
importance of citizenship within the state, and to the ideal forms of Platonic philosophy; the 
rise of capitalism refers to the ascendancy of its rule over lived reality, the museums to the 
detachment and management of historical thought,101 and the collapse of the workers” 
movement to the latter’s subordination to representational and Statist politics. Yet one need 
not bury oneself in the details of Debord’s private letters in order to find evidence for this 
view. Within The Society of the Spectacle itself he states explicitly that “power draped itself 
in the outward garb of a mythical order from the beginning”; that “all separate power has 
been spectacular”,102 and that “at the root of the spectacle lies the oldest of all social 
specialisations, the specialisation of power”.103  
Clearly, this notion of separated power has brought us a long way from the media-
centric readings of spectacle referred to at the beginning of this essay. Yet it also encompasses 
Debord’s Marxian claims, which describe society as a whole as having become subordinated 
to its own alienated activity. This broader reading is also able to accommodate the many 
instances in Debord and the S.I.’s work where the term “spectacle” was used to refer to 
phenomena that bear little obvious relation to capital or to the commodity per se (e.g. 
Debord’s objections to Leninism and its apologists,104 his numerous critical descriptions of 
leaders and figureheads,105 or indeed his concern in the late 1960s that the S.I. itself was 
growing dangerously spectacular106). And if the basic dynamic of spectacle is not reducible to 
the socio-economic modes that brought it to its full manifestation, then presumably spectacle, 
in some form, is likely to arise in any instance where historical agency and collective power 
became alienated and transposed onto an “external” body: for as Debord himself put it, 
“wherever there is independent representation”, the spectacle “reconstitutes itself”.107  
This means that it would not be enough to simply abolish capitalism in order to end 
spectacle, for the simple reason that spectacle simply cannot be reductively identified with 
capitalist society. In order to truly abolish spectacle, far more is required: for in addition to 
ending the economy’s sovereignty over lived existence, all hierarchies, independent proxies 
for constitutive agency, and fixed, dogmatic forms must also be superseded. The concept of 
spectacle, therefore, implies a collectivist-anarchist ethics: an ethics that is wedded to the 
notion of historical process and praxis developed above. 
The identification of an ethics within this material invites the obvious objection that it 
could be seem to contradict the S.I.’s inherently anti-dogmatic stance. It should also be 
acknowledged that the S.I. consistently described morality in terms of ideology, and that 
Debord can be seen to have (indirectly) associated the rejection of moral norms with the 
communist project per se.108 Furthermore, his concerns with subjective autonomy owe a debt 
to Stirner, for whom “the dominion of morality” is also that of “the sacred”,109 and thus an 
imagined authority that must be rejected. Yet evidence as to the presence of ethical themes 
can certainly be found in Debord’s writings on a subjective110 and anecdotal level,111 and 
indeed on a theoretical level too. This is because his work ultimately describes a drive 
towards a mode of collective “association” – to use a phrase that he borrowed from the 
Communist Manifesto112 – “in which the free development of each is the condition for the 
free development of all”.113 This must be a form of association in which the ability to shape 
one’s own time is predicated on the ability of all others, insofar as it entails the absence of 
hierarchy and coercion, and the abolition of independent bodies of social power. Identifying 
such an ethics in Debord’s work does not, therefore, require the invocation of a fixed and 
universal notion of reason, a metaphysics or an essentialised humanism, but instead refers to 
the conditions of existence of the form of collective, self-determinate praxis that he 
advocated.  
These themes can therefore help us to develop that notion of praxis, and to thereby 
ward off the charges of relativism that might be engendered by the epistemological issues 
touched on above. As stressed above, the goal of Debord’s revolution is an on-going, open-
ended condition of historical praxis. Yet that goal must also be reached through praxis, given 
that it will not transpire automatically. The goal, therefore, cannot be separated from the path 
taken towards it, but rather brings the self-determinacy inherent within it to fuller, more 
complete fruition. There is therefore a unity of means and ends here that entails a 
prefigurative politics, and acknowledging this can help us to make sense of the S.I.’s view 
that an anti-spectacular project must embody its rejection of dogma, ideology and hierarchy 
within its own practical mode of organisation.   
Any such organisation, according to Debord, cannot “allow the conditions of division 
and hierarchy that obtain in the dominant society to be reproduced within itself”;114 to do 
otherwise would be to “combat alienation by means of alienated forms of struggle”.115 Or as 
the S.I. put it: “self-management”, according to the S.I., “must be both the means and the end 
of ... struggle”; it was thus “not only what is at stake in the struggle, but also its adequate 
form”.116 This unity of means and ends should be connected to Debord’s views on time: for 
as he put it in his correspondence, and in keeping with the identification of process and goal 
indicated above, “historical time”, was said to be both the “milieu and goal of the proletarian 
revolution”.117 If that is the case – and if the instantiation of that goal entails the perpetuity of 
such “historical time” – then any collectivity that might actualise it must be oriented towards 
the further instantiation of its own conditions of existence. The views developed here do not, 
therefore, imply a relativist drive towards “making history” in the abstract, but entail an 
orientation towards continued manifestations (or indeed towards the further enrichment) of 
that condition. We therefore have a model of a process that shapes and determines itself 
through continually recreating its own foundations. 
Situating these ideas in relation to the reading of Debord’s Hegelian Marxism inferred 
above can also help to make sense of the notion of collectivity that can be found in Debord’s 
work. If the ‘inversion’ of Hegel essentially means transposing his philosophy into a 
condition of praxis, then his emphasis on mutual recognition and on the organic interrelation 
of universality and particularity would seem to pertain directly to these themes. After all, 
Debord’s descriptions of the bourgeois atomisation of spectacular society (e.g. the spectacle 
is a “unity ... of generalised separation”)118 were directly informed by Marx’s claim that 
Hegel’s political philosophy had imposed an abstracted, philosophical idea of unity upon a 
fragmented reality, and indeed by his implications that communism would afford a more 
adequate mode of interrelating the universal with the particular (one might also think of 
Marx’s later claims in Capital that capital is a “social relation”119 in which “men are ... 
related in a purely atomistic way”).120  
To sum up: Debord’s work can be seen to imply a theory of communism that casts the 
latter as a condition of collective praxis within “historical time”. This however requires 
acknowledging that the concept of spectacle cannot be reductively identified with capitalist 
society per se, and that its broader dimensions ultimately pertain to the denigration or denial 
of the forms of association that would allow the institution and perpetuity of that mode of 
temporality. On this basis, we can now return to the connection between dialectical and 
strategic thought that we highlighted above. For if Debord’s Hegelian Marxism can be seen to 
frame the operation of this mode of association as the actualisation of Hegelian resolution in 
praxis, then the dialectical thought of the Hegelian system, when actualised in such praxis, 
becomes the strategic thought of that mode of association’s operation.  
 
Strategy  
 
Debord’s interest in strategy is often noted within the literature, but it has rarely been 
analysed in theoretical detail.121 This is hardly surprising, for as is also the case with his 
Hegelianism, at no point in Debord’s public work, correspondence or unpublished archive 
material does he provide us with a clear, distinct summary of his views. Yet, like his 
Hegelianism, the primary aspects of his views on strategy can be reconstructed from textual 
evidence; and whilst a discussion of its particular applications in his political analyses falls 
beyond the remit of this essay, we can at least map out its central features. At the very least, 
what follows should serve to establish that it cannot be understood in the absence of an 
engagement with his Hegelianism.  
 In one of his few substantial statements on Hegel’s work, Debord writes as follows:  
 
For Hegel it was no longer a matter of interpreting the world, but rather of interpreting the 
world’s transformation. Inasmuch as he did no more than interpret that transformation, 
however, Hegel was merely the philosophical culmination of philosophy. He sought to 
understand a world that made itself. This historical thought was still part of that 
consciousness that always arrives too late, and which pronounces a justification post festum. 
It thus superseded separation – but in thought only.122 
  
Hegel’s philosophy is thus viewed as a mode of thought that announces its claims 
after the advent of historical events, as opposed to applying itself within their creation (an 
idea that would seem to be informed by Debord’s reading of Korsch).123 Despite his 
identification of self-consciousness and freedom with history, Hegel is viewed as remaining 
at one remove from the actual movement of history, insofar as the unification that he posits 
takes place solely in philosophy. Debord is not, therefore, criticising Hegel in an Adornian 
vein for attempting to establish a condition of unity, as have many others within the French 
tradition;124 instead, he criticises him for making that attempt within the detachment of 
philosophical thought, and for thereby failing to achieve that unity, qua lived, pro-active 
praxis. Consequently, and as he puts it in his correspondence, the task posed by the critique of 
Hegel’s work is that of moving beyond Hegel’s contemplation of a world that had completed 
its own “auto-transformation”, in order to “take an active part in history”.125 This then returns 
us to Debord’s interpretation of Marx’s famous ‘inversion’ of Hegel, which does not involve 
the “trivial substitution”126 of unfolding categories for a history of developing social 
relations, but rather a change in perspective: a view according to which Marx corrects 
Hegel’s description of the present as the conclusion of the past by rendering the present the 
basis of an open future.127 This is particularly apparent in Debord’s remarks on the work of 
August Cieszkowski, a Polish young Hegelian whom he credits as having pre-figured this 
manoeuvre. Cieszkowski’s work, he claimed, stands before both Marx and Feuerbach, and 
thus at the very outset of a long line of theoretical and political development, along which 
“the dialectical method” edged ever closer to unification with “the reality that seeks it”.128 
Debord identifies that “dialectical method” with “the thought of history,”129 and implicitly 
locates himself and the S.I. at the point upon this line where that unification might be 
achieved: at the point, in other words, where all such modes of reflecting upon a historical 
world might be actualised in the process of consciously shaping the latter. Cieszkowski is 
presented as having implicitly grasped this exigency, as can be seen from Debord’s short 
summary of his critique of Hegel:  
 
Cieszkowski surpasses Hegel in purely Hegelian terms: he negates the central aporia of the 
system by simply acknowledging that time has not ended. Hegel had concluded history, in the 
form of thought, because he ultimately accepted glorifying his present. In a single 
manoeuvre, Cieszkowski reverses the system, by bringing it into contact with the “moment” 
of the future. This is because he recognised, in the thought of history – the supersession of 
philosophy – the power to transform the world.130 
 
Debord’s reading of Cieszkowski, therefore, essentially runs as follows. Time’s 
negativity, and thereby the meaning and sum truth of the human history through which the 
lived experience of time becomes self-conscious,131 cannot be captured and bound within the 
hypostatised form of a system; certainly not within one that identified such ‘truth’ with a 
single, glorified, concluding moment.132 Thus, although Hegel was right in presenting 
dialectical thought as affording historical self-consciousness – Debord explicitly associates it 
with “the thought of history” – he was nonetheless wrong in hypostatising its movement 
within the detached abstractions of a philosophical system. Debord is clearly influenced by 
Marx’s famous remarks in his postface to the second German edition of Capital, where he 
claimed that dialectical thought, once extracted from its “mystical shell”, is inherently 
critical, historical and revolutionary, because it “includes in its positive understanding of what 
exists a simultaneous recognition of its negation”, and thus “regards every historically 
developed form as being in a fluid state”.133 It seems that for Debord, this meant that 
dialectical thought afforded a means of achieving a self-conscious engagement with the flow 
of time; and if that self-consciousness was to become actualised in historical praxis, 
following Marx’s call for the realisation of philosophy, then dialectical thought was to 
become one with strategic thought. 
This interpretation of Debord’s use of Hegel, therefore, can help us to clarify his 
otherwise enigmatic identification of dialectics and strategy. Both Machiavelli and 
Clausewitz, for example, were described as proponents of “dialectical, strategic thought”,134 
and a study of both writers was said to be required, “in the current era”, in order to “complete 
readings of Hegel and of other old friends of the International”.135 The connection between 
strategy and dialectics is phrased even more explicitly in the following remarks, made on one 
of the personal reading notes that are now housed in the Debord archive at the Bibliothèque 
Nationale:  
 
It is the same thing to think dialectically and to think strategically. When one separates their 
terrains and their terms, one specialises this genre of operations, and one draws an ideological 
mantle over their methods and all their practical applications. For these terrains are evidently 
one single terrain, since both denote the totality. It is the thought of praxis, which must act; 
practical theory, in the course of its combat in time. They are the same mode of thought, and 
they are judged by the same result [C'est la même pensée qui est jugée par le même résultat].136 
  
 Strategy, therefore, corresponds directly to Debord’s concerns with the need for 
consciousness to move in step with time and history, and in this regard it can be seen to 
operate on several levels within his work. Firstly, it pertains to its existential dimensions, as it 
connects to his Sartrean view that human subjects exist within momentary situations that they 
are obliged to traverse (and which, following the Situationist project, they might deliberately 
shape). If the human subject is indeed an inherently ‘negative’ being, located in perpetual 
opposition to its present moment – and if it is also finite, and characterised by limited, 
contextual knowledge, as Debord also stresses – then that subject must continually operate 
and negotiate its circumstances on the basis of limited knowledge. The very conduct of life 
itself is thus strategic in this sense, and its constant contingencies relate to Debord’s interest 
in turning life into a game:137 for play, like strategy, requires knowing how to act at the right 
time. In fact, the import of such knowledge seems to be the real core of Debord’s 
understanding of strategy.  
It would also seem that dialectical thought was held to afford an awareness of 
conflict, flux and change within the totality of a given moment: to thus provide a means of 
recognising where and when one might strike and act effectively within such a moment. This 
can be illustrated by way of reference to the set of notes on Poker that Debord produced for 
his wife in 1990 (and which are clearly not just notes on the game of Poker). They advise that 
a good player should keep his or her own use of bluff to an absolute minimum, and that when 
others are presenting illusions and assuming all others to be doing the same, acting 
opportunely on the basis of known facts confers an advantage. To play well, he writes, “One 
must know how to employ the kairos138 of one’s forces at the right moment”.139 Such 
knowledge was clearly associated with a capacity to negotiate the tangle of bluff, feints, 
illusions and representations that Debord held to characterise the spectacular society of his 
later years. An increased emphasis on the importance of “strategic theory” can in fact be 
discerned in Debord’s thought from the mid 1970s onwards.140  Its increased importance at 
that time reflected his response to the subsidence of the events of May 1968, and his growing 
preoccupation with the intrigue and confusion of the Italian anni di piombo. The latter would 
in fact greatly inform the analyses presented in 1988’s Comments on the Society of the 
Spectacle, which contend that because modern society had rejected history, it could “no 
longer be led strategically”,141 and had consequently degenerated into a muddle of 
conflicting, fragmentary interests. Coupled to the increased existential impoverishment 
engendered by the spectacle’s continued advances, this meant, according to Debord in 1988, 
that “conditions have never been so seriously revolutionary”; yet at the same time, the 
general denigration of critical, historical thought entailed that “it is only governments who 
think so”.142 This contradiction should however be seen as the deepening of an exigency that 
had already been identified in 1967s The Society of the Spectacle. The modern “proletarian 
revolution”, Debord claimed there, “is predicated entirely on the requirement that, for the first 
time, theory as the understanding of human practice be recognised and directly lived by the 
masses”, so as to avoid its Leninist, spectacular imposition upon the latter. This meant, he 
claimed, that “workers” must “become dialecticians”.143 As we have just seen, that statement 
is tantamount to the contention that they must become strategists; and difficult though that 
may be, he remarked in a letter from that same year that “there is absolutely no other way to 
leave our sad prehistoric period”.144  
 
4) The Absolute 
 
Debord and Hyppolite 
 
There is no space here to offer a critical evaluation of the political positions that these 
remarks imply, but we should at least be able to summarise and characterise the claims that 
have been made here regarding the nature of the ideas that underlie and support Debord’s 
claims. Our aim has been to demonstrate that the latter contain a theory of communism qua 
historical agency. We’ve seen that this has its roots within Debord’s views on time and 
history, and that it seems to point beyond his own extant work, thereby implying a model of 
on-going intervention and praxis. We’ve also seen that the theory of spectacle carries ethical 
implications as regards the perpetuity and orientation of that praxis, and that Debord’s 
concerns with strategy pertain to the conceptual operation of its conduct. The result, it would 
seem, is a model of praxis that could be drawn out of Debord’s work and developed 
independently of the corpus within which it currently resides. An attempt to do so, however, 
would necessarily entail a fuller engagement with the Hegelian Marxian ideas that structure 
it, and we will therefore close by schematising them by way of the following.  
 All of the discussions above were shown to pertain to Debord’s views on the relation 
between Marx and Hegel. This is due, quite simply, to the fact that he saw his own work as a 
direct continuation of the latter writer’s contributions towards human historical emancipation. 
Hegel was seen to have grasped the relation between history, freedom, self-consciousness and 
self-determinacy; Marx was seen to have called for the actualisation of that set of relations in 
concrete historical action. Debord’s reading of the connection between these two figures, 
when viewed in terms of his own theoretical claims, appears to take Marx’s call for Hegel’s 
actualisation relatively literally, as it could be schematised as a Feuerbachian reclamation of 
qualities associated with the Hegelian Absolute. The latter’s interrelation of universality and 
particularity, and its consequent retention of perpetual unrest and self-determinate process 
within a condition of unity, appear to have been re-framed not as the end of history, but rather 
as the grounds of a fully self-conscious collective praxis. 
 These claims may seem rather speculative – as noted, this position has been inferred 
from Debord’s claims, and is not explicitly stated within them – but in addition to according 
with the textual evidence, they also bear interesting relation to Debord’s links to Jean 
Hyppolite.145 The Hegel that Debord criticises in his texts often seems to be that of Alexandre 
Kojève, i.e. a Hegel who had rashly declared history to have ended with Napoleon and the 
Prussian State. The Hegelianism that Debord developed when articulating his own positions, 
however, was in fact far closer to Hyppolite’s reading of Hegel, according to which the 
Hegelian Absolute is not a static state of arrest, but rather an endless, restless, self-
determinate process of continual rupture and re-unification. Hyppolite stresses themes such as 
these in his excellent Introduction to Hegel’s Philosophy of History of 1948 (Debord owned 
this book, and his notes on it are now stored in the Paris Archive), and he relates them to 
Marx in his exceptional Studies on Marx and Hegel of 1955 (Debord owned and made 
detailed notes on this book too). Significantly, Hyppolite presents Marx as having dismissed 
religion and speculative philosophy as alienated appearances of the unity that would be 
actualised through revolutionary praxis, describes him as having been “incapable of adopting 
a position outside of a history that is to be made at the same time as it is to be thought”,146 
and as advocating a communism that amounts to an on-going, self-constitutive process: a 
process engaged in “forever re-creating its own foundations”.147 These remarks bear obvious 
connection to the Hegelian model of communism qua praxis that we have attempted to 
reconstruct above. Consequently, although Lukács was evidently a major figure in the 
development of Debord’s Marxian analyses, Hyppolite may have played a similarly formative 
role in the evolution of the Hegelianism that supports them. 
There is of course much more to say about the issues addressed here. We have 
focussed primarily on Debord’s theoretical work from the 1960s, and have paid relatively 
little attention to that from the 1950s, or indeed the decades that followed the S.I.’s demise in 
1972. Yet having at least introduced some of the key components of the conceptual 
framework that supports Debord’s work, and having also indicated the sense in which it 
would seem to point beyond his oeuvre, we can perhaps conclude with some brief comments 
on the possible merits of pursuing these aspects of his thought further. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The apparent defeat of the May 1968 uprisings not only pertains to the evaluation of 
Situationist theory, but also to that of much of the continental political philosophy that was 
produced over the subsequent decades. The seemingly spontaneous nature of those events not 
only undermined economic determinism and the structuralism that had dismissed humanism 
and Sartrean existentialism (“structures”, to quote a slogan chalked on a Sorbonne 
blackboard, “do not march in the street”),148 but also revealed the limits of traditional modes 
of organisation, as the PCF, together with the major unions, sought to translate the 
movement’s demands into familiar and more manageable calls for higher wages. Yet the 
uprisings were ultimately subdued, and the traditional Left suffered further defeats 
throughout the following decades. Obliged to acknowledge both the lessons of the May 
events and those imposed by capital’s continued impositions, the stances that replaced those 
discredited models adopted alternative figures of social change, capable of articulating 
resistance within the networks and discursive regimes of technologically mediated 
capitalism.149 Today, by contrast, radical theory seems characterised by more retrospective 
concerns: we are not only invited to rethink the ‘idea’ of communism, but also the concepts 
and organisational forms called into question by May 1968. Žižek delights in alluding to the 
dictatorship of the proletariat, even to the point of calling, alarmingly, for a “Thatcher of the 
Left”;150 Badiou, memorably described by Debord as “Maoist carrion”,151 continues to pursue 
elements of that doctrine; Althusser, whose “sombre dementia” was also explicitly 
rejected,152 seems to be receiving renewed attention; Sartre has yet to receive a revival, but 
Hegel’s return to favour perhaps places him next in line. Within such a context of return to 
pre-68 models, there is perhaps a virtue in addressing material putatively associated with “the 
most extreme position taken up during the confrontations of 1968”:153 for if it is approached 
in the manner proposed here, one can draw from it a set of ideas pertaining to political agency 
that stand opposed to structuralism’s dismissal of the human subject, that avoid any fixed, 
essentialist naturalisation of the latter, and which also reject the organisational frameworks 
that were called into question by those “confrontations”. As this agency was also conceived 
by its own author as a force able to operate strategically upon the terrain of a seemingly 
triumphant modern capitalism, it may merit further enquiry in the vein outlined above. 
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